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There is evidence that suppliers have private information about their customers’ credit risk.
Yet, interest rates in trade credit markets are usually industry-not-ﬁrm speciﬁc. Why? If the
demand for intermediate products is inelastic, suppliers should raise interest rates until they
reach their customers’ outside option, which, by deﬁnition, cannot reﬂect information that is
privy to suppliers. In contrast, a highly elastic demand induces suppliers with monopoly power
to waive interest, making private information once more irrelevant to the trade-credit rate. By
characterizing these two equilibria, we obtain implications on when trade-credit rates shouldn’t
vary with private information held by suppliers.
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Trade credit is one of the most important sources of short-term external ﬁnancing for ﬁrms
in the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., and the U.S.).1 Smith
(1987), Mian and Smith (1992) and Biais and Gollier (1997) argue that such prominence is due
to an informational advantage: The sales eﬀort of suppliers makes it easier for them to assess
their customers’ credit risk. Accordingly, Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that, vis-à-vis banks,
suppliers extend more credit to ﬁrms with current losses and positive growth of sales; a ﬁnding
that they interpret as evidence that suppliers have comparative advantage in identifying ﬁrms
with growth potential.
Yet, a supplier’s informational advantage is, at ﬁrst glance, diﬃcult to reconcile with a stan-
dard practice in the trade credit markets. Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) and Petersen and Rajan
(1994) show that the terms of trade credit in the U.S. are industry-not-ﬁrm speciﬁc. In partic-
ular, a common term of trade credit charges an eﬀective interest rate of 44 percent a year by
combining a 30 day maturity with a two percent discount for early payment within 10 days of the
invoice (2-10 net 30 loans). But if suppliers are informed lenders, why don’t they charge interest
rates that reﬂect variations in the borrowers’ risk?
This paper explains when and why interest rates in the trade credit markets do not internalize
private information held by suppliers. In a nutshell, suppliers should raise trade-credit rates until
they reach their customers’ outside option, if the demand for the suppliers’ goods is inelastic with
respect to the ﬁnancing costs. By deﬁnition, this outside option — e.g. ,t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea v a i l a b l e
in banking loans — cannot reﬂect information that is privy to suppliers. In contrast, a suﬃciently
elastic demand induces suppliers with monopoly power to waive interest, making their private
information once more irrelevant to the equilibrium trade-credit rate. Trade credit rates do
not vary with the suppliers’ private information, therefore, when the demand is inelastic or if
suppliers with monopoly power face a demand that is suﬃciently elastic with respect to interest
rates.
To understand the main ideas of the paper, consider an industry whose ﬁrms require ﬁnancing
to purchase inputs from their suppliers. In a fraction f of these ﬁrms — the safe ﬁrms — the
investment in the input will be paid back with probability one. In the remaining ﬁrms, fraction
1See, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995).
11 − f, the investment in the input may fail. We call these latter ﬁrms risky.
To ﬁnance the purchase of inputs, ﬁrms can borrow from banks or ask for trade credit. As
such, we consider ﬁrms that, albeit possibly risky, are notc r e d i tc o n s t r a i n e d . I nt h em o d e l ,
banks act competitively (i.e., interest rates imply that the expected return on a loan equals the
cost of funds), but they cannot distinguish between safe and risky ﬁrms. Hence, banks charge
t h es a m ei n t e r e s tr a t erB to all ﬁrms in the industry.
In contrast to the banks, suppliers know whether their customers are safe or risky. Thanks to
this informational advantage, a supplier may oﬀer interest rates that vary with the ﬁrm’s type.
Competition with banks constrains the suppliers’ choices of interest rate, though. In particular,
suppliers cannot extend trade credit at an interest rate that is higher than the customer’s outside
option, which, in our model, is the banking rate rB.
To be sure, competition with banks doesn’t prevent suppliers from extending credit at low
interest rates. Is it in the suppliers’ interest to undercut banks? This won’t be the case if the
demand for the inputs is inelastic with respect to the ﬁnancing cost. Intuitively, an inelastic
demand induces suppliers to, regardless of the customer’s creditworthiness, raise interest to the
b a n k i n gr a t e ,w h i c hi sa sh i g ha sat r a d ec r e d i tr a t ec a nb e .A ni n e l a s t i cd e m a n dt h u sg i v e su sa
natural candidate for an equilibrium trade credit rate that does not vary with suppliers’ private
information: the banking rate rB. One problem remains for this candidate to be legitimate,
though. Informed suppliers may be unwilling to lend to risky ﬁrms at an interest rate that is set
by uninformed banks that ﬁercely compete with each other.
As it turns out, there is at least one good reason for suppliers to lend to risky ﬁrms at the
banking rate. Frank and Maksimovic (1998) argue that suppliers are more eﬃcient than banks in
salvaging value from assets of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms. If so, suppliers get a higher return than
banks when a borrower becomes ﬁnancially distressed; an advantage that may make it proﬁtable
for suppliers to extend credit to risky ﬁrms at the banking rate.
What happens if the demand for inputs is inelastic but suppliers are not more eﬃcient than
banks in lending to risky ﬁrms? The equilibrium at the banking rate breaks down. Petersen and
Rajan (1997) show that suppliers extend less credit in industries that keep a high fraction of
ﬁnished goods in inventory; a ﬁnding that they interpret as evidence that it is easier for suppliers
to transform repossessed inputs (rather than ﬁnished goods) into liquid assets. Accordingly, our
2model predicts that suppliers are more likely to oﬀer standardized rates in industries that keep
a low fraction of ﬁnished goods in the inventory. This implication will not hold, for instance, if
the observed rigidity of trade credit rates in the U.S. reﬂects suppliers’ ability to use the price
of their products to adjust for the riskiness of their customers.
Our model builds on two recent papers: Biais and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen
(2002). These articles explain why suppliers lend to ﬁrms that have exhausted their debt capacity
with banks. In Biais and Gollier, suppliers can identify ﬁrms whose credit risks are overestimated
by banks. Knowing that a ﬁrm’s credit line is unduly low, suppliers are willing to extend trade
credit. In Burkart and Ellingsen, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms have access to trade credit because
it implies a lower risk of misuse of corporate funds than banking loans. In Biais and Gollier’s
and Burkart and Ellingsen’s models, the optimal trade-credit rate varies with the suppliers’
information.
Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988) is another related work. In this paper, a monopolist
sells products to safe and risky customers, discriminating the demand by oﬀering trade credit
to the risky customers at a subsidized interest rate. As in Biais and Gollier (1997) and Burkart
and Ellingsen (2002), the optimal trade-credit rate in Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner would
vary with the suppliers’ private information, had there been trade credit to customers in diﬀerent
classes of risk.
As in Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988), a suﬃciently elastic demand for inputs
makes low ﬁnancing costs so important to sales that, in our model, it dissuades the suppliers
from raising the trade-credit rate to their customers’ outside option. In fact, we shall demonstrate
that suppliers with monopoly power have incentives to waive interest, if the demand for inputs
is suﬃciently elastic. A second equilibrium in which the trade-credit rate does not internalize
the suppliers’ private information thus obtains: trade credit at zero interest.
In our model, therefore, interest rates in trade credit markets do not internalize private
information held by suppliers, in two instances. If the demand for inputs is inelastic, in which
case the trade credit rate matches the customers’ outside option, or if the supplier has monopoly
power and the demand for inputs is suﬃciently elastic, in which case the equilibrium trade credit
rate is at zero.
In addition to explaining why trade-credit rates shouldn’t vary with private information held
3by suppliers, our model links the invariance of trade-credit rates to whether ﬁrms are credit
constrained. Since waiving interest attracts all types of ﬁrms, there is no reason for the demand
for trade credit at zero interest to consist mainly of credit constrained ﬁrms. It is easy to see,
however, that, at positive trade-credit rates, private information held by suppliers matters when
customers are credit constrained. In this case, competition with banks does not constrain the
suppliers’ choices of trade-credit rates, implying that the optimal terms of trade credit depend
on any ﬁrm-speciﬁc information that suppliers may have: elasticity of demand, probability of
default, etc. Another prediction of our model is thus that suppliers are more likely to oﬀer
standardized rates to customers that are not credit constrained.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After presenting the model in section
2, section 3 characterizes the equilibrium in which the trade credit rate does not vary with
private information held by suppliers. In section 4, we discuss the empirical implications and
exhibit suﬃcient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium. Section 5 then concludes. Proofs of
the propositions that are not in the text can be found in the appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with two dates, t =0and t =1 , and an industry with three risk-neutral
agents: ﬁrms, banks, and a supplier of the ﬁrms’ inputs. At t =0 , ﬁrms require ﬁnancing to
purchase inputs. Banks are always willing to ﬁnance the purchase of inputs at an interest rate
that covers the cost of funds. Firms, however, may have a second source of ﬁnancing: trade
credit. With an exogenous probability x, the supplier has enough funds to ﬁnance its customers.
Upon the purchase of inputs at t =0 , production takes place and ﬁrms sell the output at t =1 .
At this time, ﬁrms repay the debt and distribute any remaining cash ﬂow to shareholders. Below
we describe the agents’ technologies and their information structures.
2.1 Firms
There are two types of ﬁrms, safe and risky, which are run by value-maximizing managers who
know their ﬁrms’ types from the onset. The safe ﬁrms represent a fraction f of the population
and have a deterministic production function. With this safe technology, investing I units of
4the input at t =0obtains Q(I) at t =1 . We assume that Q(I) is an increasing and strictly
concave function, with Q(0) = 0 and satisfying the following condition: there exist investment
levels I and I such that Q0(I) >p (1 + r)/f and Q0(I) <p ,w h e r er is the riskless interest rate,
f is the proportion of safe ﬁrms in the industry, and p is the price of the input. These harmless
assumptions on the marginal productivity assure that ﬁrms buy a positive level of input.
Risky ﬁrms are endowed with a stochastic production function. With this technology, pur-
chasing I units of input at t =0yields ˜ Q(I) at t =1 , where:
˜ Q(I)=
(
Q(I), with probability π
pδI, with probability 1 − π, and δ (0,1).
Note that, with probability π, the risky technology is as proﬁtable as the safe technology.
But, with probability 1−π, the risky technology gets into trouble; the fraction 1−δ of purchased
inputs is lost and the only return on the investment is an amount δI of inputs that remained
unused, yielding a residual value pδI. We assume that both Q(I) and ˜ Q(I) are veriﬁable. As
such, ﬁrms can write debt contracts that are contingent on the realization of outputs.
2.2 Banks
In the model, banks can neither distinguish between ﬁrms of diﬀerent types nor observe the
terms of trade credit. Banks know only the proportion of safe and risky ﬁrms, and the amount
of inputs I that ﬁrms purchase. Since banks operate in a competitive market, they will set an
interest rate, rB, that yields their opportunity cost. Given risk neutrality, this opportunity cost
is the riskless interest rate r.
If a risky ﬁrm fails, the lender captures the ﬁrm’s output, ˜ Q(I),w h i c hi st h ef r a c t i o nδ of the
amount pI originally purchased. It is unlikely, nonetheless, that banks can costlessly transform
δI into liquid assets. In fact, one of the key assumptions of our paper is that banks are not
as eﬃcient as suppliers in transforming inputs into liquid assets. To emphasize this diﬀerence
between banks and suppliers, and to facilitate the analysis, we assume that neither the banks
nor the ﬁrms can rescue the unused inputs, δI, if the technology fails.
52.3 The supplier
To focus the analysis on the trade credit market, we follow Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner
(1988) and assume that suppliers cannot use the price of the input to discriminate the demand.
As Petersen and Rajan (1997) point out, this hypothesis can be justiﬁed by anti-trust laws.
Yet, we do not want to restrict the attention to industries in which a supplier has monopoly
power in the market for input. Despite assuming that each ﬁrm buys inputs from a single supplier,
the input market may be contestable, that is, the potential entry of alternative suppliers may
drive input prices down to marginal cost. Hence, we assume that the supplier faces a constant
marginal cost c a n da ne x o g e n o u sp r i c ep of the input. The mark-up,
p
c, measures the degree
of monopoly power in the market for input. For
p
c =1 , the market for inputs is competitive,
while
p
c > 1 implies that the supplier enjoys some monopoly power. In this latter case, the
supplier faces a two-stage problem; choosing the optimal trade-credit rate for any given input
price in the ﬁrst stage, and then looking for the optimal input price in the second stage. For
the purpose of our work, we can restrict attention to the ﬁrst stage problem, characterizing the
optimal trade-credit rate as a function of the mark-up
p
c.
A common view in the trade-credit literature is that suppliers have comparative advantage
over banks in ﬁnancing purchases of inputs. Biais and Gollier (1997) argue, for instance, that
an ongoing sales eﬀort makes it easier for suppliers to evaluate their customers’ credit risk; an
argument that Petersen and Rajan (1997) ﬁnd evidence for. Accordingly, we assume that, unlike
the banks, the supplier knows whether a ﬁrm is risky or safe.
Ability to evaluate risk of credit is not the only reason for the existence of trade credit,
though. Petersen and Rajan (1997) also ﬁnd evidence that suppliers are more eﬃcient than
banks in transforming collateral into liquid assets. To model this advantage, we follow Frank
and Maksimovic (1998) and assume that, unlike the banks, the supplier can costlessly resell
inputs that they capture from bankrupted ﬁrms. Hence, when a risky investment of I units
of input fails, the supplier captures the unused inputs, δI, assuring some return on their trade
credit. We assume, however, that the supplier loses when a risky customer is bankrupted. That
is, the present value of the rescued inputs
pδI
1+r is lower than the suppliers’ cost of producing the
input, cI , which implies that
p
c < 1+r
δ ; an inequality that is trivially satisﬁed if the input market
is competitive.
6But, as Mian and Smith (1992) show, some suppliers do not have access to funds that can be
used to provide trade credit. We model this potential constraint as follows. With a probability
x in the interval (0,1), our supplier has access to funds at the same cost of banks, r.I n t h i s
event, the supplier can extend trade credit. With probability 1−x, however, the supplier has no
access to funds, ruling out trade credit. Firms will then have to secure bank loans to purchase
inputs. The supplier’s stochastic cost of funds assures an active role for banking credit, despite
t h es u p p l i e r ’ sp o t e n t i a la d v a n t a g ea sal e n d e r .
2.4 The game in the extensive form
Figure 1 describes the extensive form of the game. Nature acts ﬁrst, determining at date t = −1
t h et y p eo ft h eﬁrm (safe or risky) and whether the supplier can provide trade credit. At t =0 ,
the supplier and the ﬁrms learn the ﬁrms’ types and whether trade credit is available. If the
supplier cannot extend trade credit, an event with probability 1 − x, ﬁrms borrow from banks
before purchasing IB from the supplier. If, instead, trade credit is available, the banks and the
supplier make simultaneous oﬀers to ﬁnance purchases of inputs. Since banks do not know the
ﬁrm’s type, they oﬀer the same interest rate rB to both types of ﬁrms, while the informed supplier
may tailor the interest rate to the ﬁrm’s type, oﬀering rR
T to risky ﬁrms and rS
T to safe ﬁrms.
These interest rates determine ﬁrms’ returns on the purchase of inputs, inducing risky ﬁrms to
invest IR
T and safe ﬁrms to invest IS
T.
At time t =1 ,c a s hﬂows are generated according to the production functions Q(I) and ˜ Q(I).
And ﬁrms pay back their loans whenever possible. Shareholders then capture any cash ﬂow left
after the debt is paid.
The game has two types of equilibria. In the ﬁrst one, the supplier lends to at most one type of
ﬁrm. In the second type of equilibrium, suppliers lend to both types of ﬁrms, whenever possible.
The ﬁrst type of equilibrium is not interesting for the purposes of our work. If borrowers are
all in the same class of risk, there is no scope for the supplier to vary the trade-credit rate with
the customers’ creditworthiness. As such, our focus in on the equilibrium in which, whenever
possible, the supplier lends to both types. After characterizing this equilibrium in section 3, we
exhibit conditions for it to be unique in section 4.
73 Equilibrium with Invariance of Interest Rates
3.1 Banking credit
In the equilibrium that we look for, the supplier extends trade credit to both types of ﬁrms,
whenever possible. When trade credit is not available, an event with probability 1 − x, ﬁrms
ﬁnance purchases of inputs by borrowing from banks. Let us then start our analysis by deriving
the demand for inputs of a safe ﬁrm that borrows from banks at an interest rate rB.
By assumption, safe ﬁrms can always repay loans that are used to ﬁnance inputs.2 As a
result, a safe ﬁrm’s optimal investment in inputs solves:
max
I
Q(I) − (1 + rB)pI
(1 + r)
. (1)
Program (1) looks for the investment that maximizes the present value of a safe ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
By investing pI at t =0 ,as a f eﬁrm obtains Q(I) at t =1with probability one, paying (1 + rB)pI
in principal plus interest to the bank (also at t =1 ). Since the investment of a safe ﬁrm is riskless,
we discount its payoﬀ at the riskless interest rate r. Given the interest rate rB,t h eﬁrst order
condition, which is also suﬃcient, yields the demand for inputs of the safe ﬁrm, IS
B (rB),b y





Consider now a risky ﬁrm that borrows pI to purchase inputs. With probability π,t h e
investment will yield the same return Q(I) of the safe ﬁrms. With probability 1 − π, however,
the investment will fail, leaving only δI units of inputs at t =1 . Regardless of the lender’s ability
to transform the residual inputs into liquid assets, a failure of the risky technology implies that
the ﬁrm loses all rights on the residual inputs. Given the assumption of risk neutrality, the
demand for inputs of a risky ﬁrm, IR
B (rB), maximizes the present value of the expected payoﬀs,
using the riskless interest rate as the discount rate, that is,
2For any ﬁnite interest rate, our assumptions on the marginal productivity of investment (see section 2.1)
assure that a small purchase of inputs will more than oﬀset the costs of servicing the debt, leaving a positive
proﬁt for the safe ﬁrm. Hence, an optimal choice of inputs must imply a positive proﬁt as well. In the absence of
uncertainty, a positive proﬁt implies that any debt will be repaid with probability one.
8max
I
π[Q(I) − (1 + rB)pI]
(1 + r)
. (3)
Like the safe ﬁrms, a risky ﬁrm’s demand for inputs sets the marginal productivity of invest-
ment equal to the cost of ﬁnancing, that is, Q0(IR
B)=( 1+rB)p. It then follows that the demand
schedules of safe and risky ﬁrms are equal, that is, IS
B = IR
B = IB. Indeed, had the demand for
loans varied across ﬁrms of diﬀerent types, banks would have been able to infer the type of a
ﬁrm that requests a loan. Banks and suppliers would then end up with the same information
structure, and our model would not be ﬁt to explain why interest rates in the trade credit markets
do not seem to reﬂect suppliers’ private information about their customers.
Of course, a request of a bank loan may convey information even if safe and risky ﬁrms have
identical demands for inputs. For instance, in an equilibrium in which the supplier ﬁnances only
safe ﬁrms, banks should expect that most of their loans go to risky ﬁrms. (Banks should not
expect all ﬁr m st ob er i s k yb e c a u s el a c ko ft r a d ec r e d i tm i g h tl e a ds a f eﬁrms to look for banking
credit.) In the equilibrium that we look for, though, the supplier ﬁnances both types of ﬁrms,
whenever possible. Thus, banks know that lack of funds for trade credit is the only reason for
ﬁrms asking for bank loans. Accordingly, requests of loans do not convey information, and banks
do not update their priors about ﬁrms’ types.
Provided that requests for loans do not convey information, we can easily derive the equi-
librium interest rate rB. Since the technologies of both types of ﬁrms are common knowledge,
the banks know that safe ﬁrms will pay principal plus interest with probability one, while risky
ﬁr m sw i l lh o n o rt h ed e b tc o n t r a c tw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yπ.( R i s k y ﬁrms do not pay anything with
probability 1−π.) Therefore, the banks will collect principal plus interest at t =1if the ﬁrm is
safe, probability f,o ri ft h eﬁrm is risky but the technology does not fail, probability π(1 − f).
In other words, the probability that a borrower pays a bank at t =1is f + π(1 − f).A n dt h e
expected return of a bank that lends at a rate rB is (1 + rB)(f + π(1 − f)).
Competition among banks drives the expected returns on banking loans to their opportunity
cost, which, under the assumption of risk neutrality, is the riskless interest rate r.A ss u c h ,t h e
interest rate that assures banks their opportunity cost is
rB =
1+r
f + π(1 − f)
− 1. (4)
9Having characterized the equilibrium banking rate and the demand for inputs of ﬁrms that
borrow from banks, our next task is to introduce trade credit. Two questions then naturally
arise. Is it optimal for the supplier to ﬁnance purchases of inputs? What is the optimal interest
rate in the trade credit market? Answering these questions requires solving for the investment
decision of a ﬁrm that has the option of using trade credit to ﬁnance purchases of inputs.
As it turns out, trade credit does not fundamentally change ﬁrms’ investment decisions.
Whether a ﬁrm borrows from banks or from the supplier, all that matters is the cost of ﬁnancing.
It then follows that the investment decisions of safe and risk ﬁrms are still characterized by,
respectively, programs (1) and (3), once we substitute the minimum cost of ﬁnancing for the
banking rate. Thus, for both types of ﬁrms, the demand for inputs, I, is implicitly deﬁned by
the equality of the marginal productivity of investment and the cost of ﬁnancing. Formally,
Q
0(I(s)) = (1 + s)p, (5)
where s is the lowest between the banking rate and the trade credit rate.
Equation (5) determines the shape of the demand for inputs. A straightforward application
of the implicit function theorem shows that the demand for inputs decreases with the cost of
ﬁnancing. Furthermore, the demand is strictly concave if Q000(I) < 0.3 Equipped with the
demand for inputs, the next two sections characterize the supplier’s optimal strategies, starting
with the optimal terms of trade credit of a supplier that faces a safe customer.
3.2 The supply of trade credit to safe ﬁrms
In our model, a sale of inputs is not necessarily linked to trade credit. Firms can borrow from
banks to ﬁnance purchases of inputs and, rather than extending trade credit, suppliers can let
banks ﬁnance the ﬁrms. These outside options impose restrictions on the optimal terms of trade
credit. For instance, no safe ﬁrm will accept terms of trade credit that ask for an interest rate
that is larger than the banking rate rB. As such, a ﬁrst restriction for the optimal trade-credit
3To show that I (·) is decreasing and concave (under Q000(·) < 0)o nt h ec o s to fﬁnancing, apply the implicit
function to Q0(I)=( 1+s)p to obtain I0 =
p
Q00(I), which is negative because, by assumption, Q00(I) < 0. Assuming





In turn, the supplier is not obliged to extend trade credit to sell its products. Banks can
ﬁnance purchases of inputs! To see what type of restriction this outside option yields, consider
ﬁrst the supplier’s discounted proﬁts, ΦS
T(rS















At a trade-credit rate rS

















in principal plus interest at t =1 ,
when the trade credit is due. Discounting this riskless cash inﬂow to time t =0and subtracting
the supplier’s cost of production yield equation (6) as the discounted proﬁt.
Suppose now that, rather than extending trade credit, the supplier lets banks ﬁnance safe
ﬁrms at an interest rate rB. The demand for inputs of the safe ﬁrm will then be I(rB), generating
ap r o ﬁt for the supplier on the amount of (p − c)I(rB). The supplier’s outside option of letting
banks ﬁnance safe ﬁrms then requires that proﬁts with trade credit, ΦS
T(rS
T), are bigger than or
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> (p − c)I(rB). (9)
The objective function of Program (7) is the discounted proﬁt of a supplier who extends trade
c r e d i tt oas a f eﬁrm. The constraint (8) rules out interest rates that are larger than the banking
rate and imposes a lower bound that prevents negative interest rates. The rationale for this lower
bound is as follows. A negative trade-credit rate is observably equivalent to a combination of a
zero interest and a discount in the price of the input. Hence, ruling out negative trade-credit rates
4A supplier with monopoly power may fetch an interest rate higher than rB by denying inputs to ﬁrms that
do not use trade credit. The analysis in the paper, therefore, ignores distortions in the trade credit markets that
are driven by these types of bundling strategies.
11amounts to restricting attention to testable implications on the trade-credit rates. Finally, the
inequality (9) assures that proﬁts with trade credit outweigh proﬁts conditioned on letting banks
ﬁnance the safe ﬁrm, which is the supplier’s outside option. If this condition is not satisﬁed, it
is optimal for the supplier not to extend trade credit to the safe ﬁrm.
As we showed in section 3.1, Q000(.) < 0 is a suﬃcient condition for the demand for inputs







T) , Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal trade-credit rate with a safe ﬁrm.
Proposition 1 - Assume that the investment function is strictly concave on the interest rate.
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1+r−c ≡  S(0);
b rS
T ∈ (0,r B),i f (rB) >  S(rB) and either  (0) <  S(0) or
p
c ≤ 1+r.
To get some intuition for Proposition 1, let us compare the supplier’s proﬁtw i t ha n dw i t h o u t
trade credit. Without trade credit, banks will ﬁnance the safe ﬁrm at an interest rate rB, implying
that the supplier will sell — for cash — I(rB) u n i t so ft h ei n p u ta tap r o ﬁto f(p−c)I(rB). In turn,
















. This equation decomposes the discounted proﬁts in two














trade credit at the banking rate rB,t h eo p e r a t i o n a lp r o ﬁt matches the total proﬁts without trade
credit, (p − c)I(rB), and, in addition, the supplier gets a ﬁnancial proﬁto f(
rB−r
1+r )pI (rB) > 0.
Hence, it is always optimal for the supplier to extend trade credit to safe ﬁrms.
The banking rate is not necessarily the optimal trade-credit rate, though. On the one hand,
a large trade-credit rate increases ﬁnancial proﬁts per unit of trade credit,
rB−r
1+r . On the other
hand, it reduces the demand for inputs, at least partially oﬀsetting the beneﬁts of a large ﬁnancial
margin. A trade oﬀ on the choice of the trade-credit rate thus exists. Analogously to the analysis







1+r −c, below which the gains of a large margin outweigh the loss of demand,
making it optimal for the supplier to increase the trade-credit rate to the upper bound rB.






1+r −c? Then the optimal
t r a d er a t ei sl o w e rt h a nrB, because the gains from an increased demand for inputs more than
oﬀset the loss of the ﬁnancial margin. The mark-up of the supplier and the elasticity of demand
determine how low the optimal trade-credit rate will go. Waiving interest is optimal if the mark-
up is large enough to assure proﬁts at a zero interest,
p
c > 1+r, and if, despite the zero-interest,




1+r−c. If either of these two conditions does not
hold, then the optimal trade-credit rate makes marginal proﬁts equal to zero, lying in the open
interval (0,r B).
In section 3.4, we will use Proposition 1 to exhibit conditions that assure that the supplier
chooses the same interest rate for safe and risky ﬁrms. But ﬁr s tw em u s td e r i v et h es u p p l yo f
trade credit to risky ﬁrms.
3.3 The supply of trade credit to risky ﬁrms
Let us now move to the risky ﬁrms. In our model, risky ﬁrms have the option of borrowing from
banks at the interest rate rB. At such interest rate, the expected return of lending to risky ﬁrms
does not cover the banks’ cost of funds; banks lend to risky ﬁrms at rB because they do not
know the ﬁrm’s type. The banks’ inability to distinguish between risky and safe ﬁrms may have
repercussions in the trade credit markets. In particular, the banking system works as an outside
option for the risky ﬁrms, preventing the supplier from exte n d i n gt r a d ec r e d i ta ta ni n t e r e s tr a t e
larger than rB. But why should then a supplier lend to risky ﬁr m sa ta ni n t e r e s tr a t et h a tb a n k s
would deny credit had they known the ﬁrm’s type?
Suppliers have at least two reasons for extending trade credit at an interest rate rR
T ≤ rB.
First, lending to risky ﬁrms at rB may impose an expected loss to banks and yet assure an
expected proﬁt to suppliers if their comparative advantage over banks in transforming collateral
into liquid assets, δ, is large enough. Second, as Schwartz and Whitcomb (1997) and Brennan,
Maksimovic and Zechner (1998) point out, suppliers with monopoly power may be willing to
oﬀer a subsidized rate to boost proﬁtable sales. Accordingly, one would expect that if either the
supplier’s comparative advantage in default, δ ,o ri t sm a r k u p ,
p
c, is large enough, then extending




























≥ (p − c)I (rB),( 1 0 )
The left-hand side of the inequality (10) is the supplier’s discounted proﬁt conditioned on
extending trade credit at an interest rate rR
T. With probability π,t h er i s k yﬁrm succeeds, paying






,a tt i m et =1 . With probability 1−π,t h er i s k yﬁrm fails





.F r o mt h e












the riskless interest rate to t =0 . The discounted proﬁt then obtains once we subtract the cost
of producing the input. Condition (10) requires that this discounted proﬁtb el a r g e rt h a nt h e
supplier’s proﬁt without trade credit, which is cashed at t =0and amounts to (p − c)I (rB).5






















Extending trade credit to a risky ﬁrm at an interest rate rR
T can thus be optimal only if the
supplier’s advantage in rescuing assets of bankrupted ﬁrms, δ, is larger than or equal to a cut-oﬀ,
δ(rR
T),t h a ta s s u r e st h a tp r o ﬁts match the supplier’s outside option, (p − c)I(rB). As section 4
will show, this necessary condition yields testable implications of our model. Accordingly, we
shall substitute condition (11) for condition (10), writing the supplier’s problems as
5The role of the banking rate as an outside option thus determines the equilibrium level of interest rates in
the trade credit markets, even for suppliers that provide all of their customers’ ﬁnancing requirements. Felli and
Harris (1996) explore this role of outside options in a model of investment decisions in human capital. They show
that an employee’s productivity in a rival ﬁrm matters, even when an investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital



























subject to 0 ≤ r
R




Proposition 2 characterizes the solution of program (12), showing that the optimal trade-
credit rate depends not only on the supplier’s advantage in rescuing assets of bankrupted ﬁrms,





,a n dt h em a r k - u p
p
c.
Proposition 2 - Assume that the demand for inputs is strictly concave on the interest rate and let
r∗R
T be the trade-credit rate that, conditioned on extending trade credit, maximizes the supplier’s
discounted proﬁts. Thus, it is optimal for the supplier to extend trade credit to risky ﬁrms if and
only if δ ≥ δ(r∗R
T ),i nw h i c hc a s er∗R
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1+r−c ≡  R(rB);o rδ = δ(rB) and
p
c =1 ;
0, if δ ≥ δ(0),
p






1+r−c ≡  R(0);
b rR
T ∈ (0,r B),i fδ ≥ δ(b rR




Unlike in the case of a safe ﬁrm, Proposition 2 shows that trade credit to risky ﬁrms may
be optimal and yet the best that the supplier can do is to break even. This will happen if the
supplier’s advantage in default is just enough to assure the supplier’s outside option, δ = δ(rB),
and, in addition, competition in the market for inputs,
p
c =1 , drives the outside option to zero.
In this case, trade credit implies an expected loss for any interest rate lower than rB. The banking
rate, therefore, maximizes discounted proﬁts — and solves the supplier’s problem — regardless of
the elasticity of demand.
The trade-oﬀ between margin of proﬁts and volume of transactions becomes relevant again,
though, if the supplier has monopoly power,
p
c > 1, or if its advantage in default makes trade
credit a strictly dominant strategy for the supplier, that is, δ>δ(rB).I nb o t hc a s e s ,e x t e n d i n g
trade credit to risky ﬁrms at the banking rate yields positive proﬁts. And, as in the case of a
safe ﬁrm, the banking rate is rB is indeed the optimal trade-credit rate if and only if the demand








1+r−c. If the demand is
not suﬃciently inelastic, then it is optimal for the supplier to reduce the trade-credit, and it is
optimal to waive interest if and only if the supplier has monopoly power,
p
c > 1,a n dt h ed e m a n d







Propositions 1 and 2 establish the optimal terms of trade credit to safe and risky ﬁrms, giving
us all we need for characterizing an equilibrium in which the trade-credit rate does not vary with
the ﬁrm’s type.
3.4 Characterizing the equilibrium
An equilibrium in which the trade-credit rate does not vary with the ﬁrm’s type has two main
ingredients. First, the supplier must have incentives to extend trade credit to both types of ﬁrms,
or else we rule out variations of interest rates across ﬁrms from the onset. While the supplier
always has incentives to extend trade credit to safe ﬁrms, Proposition 2 shows that trade credit
to risky ﬁrms is optimal if and only if the supplier’s advantage in rescuing unused inputs, δ,i s
larger than a certain cut-oﬀ δ(r∗R
T ).I n t u i t i v e l y ,t h i sﬁrst restriction limits the cost that a risky
ﬁrm’s default may impose on the supplier.
The second ingredient for an equilibrium with invariant trade-credit rates is standard: there
cannot be incentives for the supplier to deviate from the invariant rate, regardless of the ﬁrm’s
type. Accordingly, the equilibrium trade-credit rate must satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions of
problems (7) and (12). Proposition 3, below, shows that this restriction implies that the optimal
trade-credit rate with a risky ﬁrm is larger than or equal to the optimal rate with a safe ﬁrms.
More importantly, the proposition shows that these optimal trade-credit rates can be equal only
at the banking rate or at zero, which are, therefore, the only candidates for an equilibrium
trade-credit rate that does not vary with the ﬁrm’s type.
Proposition 3 - The optimal trade-credit rate with a risky ﬁrm is bigger than or equal to the
optimal trade-credit rate with a safe ﬁrm, with equality only at the banking rate and at the zero-
interest rate. In particular, if it is optimal for the supplier to extend trade credit to risky ﬁrms
6The proof of Proposition 2 shows that, for waiving interest to be optimal, the mark-up must be large enough
to assure strictly positive proﬁts at a zero trade-credit rate, that is,
p
c > 1+r
π+(1−π)δ. The proof of Proposition 2 also
shows, nonetheless, that monopoly power,
p
c > 1,s u ﬃces for strictly positive proﬁts if we also require δ ≥ δ(0).
16at zero interest, then waiving interest is also optimal with a safe ﬁrm. And if it is optimal for
the supplier to oﬀer trade credit to safe ﬁrms at the banking rate, then either it is not optimal to
extend trade credit to risky ﬁrms or the banking rate is the optimal trade-credit rate with a risky
ﬁrm.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is straightforward. Although a high interest rate assures
creditors a high margin of ﬁnancial proﬁts, it reduces the demand for loans, partly oﬀsetting the
beneﬁts of a high margin. These incentives for lowering interest rates are at their peak when the
borrower is a safe ﬁrm. In this case, a reduction in the volume of trade credit accounts for the
loss of a sure proﬁt. In contrast, a reduction in the volume of trade credit does not lead to a loss
in the states of nature that a risky ﬁrm becomes bankrupted. As such,t h eo p t i m a lt r a d e - c r e d i t
rate with a risky ﬁrm is in general larger than the optimal rate with a safe ﬁrm. The exceptions
are at the banking rate, from which a further increase is not possible because banks provide an
outside option for the ﬁrms; and at a zero-interest rate, from which a further decrease would
imply negative interest rates that are observably equivalent to a zero trade-credit rate with a
reduction in the price of input (price discrimination).
Accordingly, let’s start looking for an equilibrium in which the supplier extends trade credit
to both ﬁrms at the banking rate. From Proposition 3, if the banking rate maximizes discounted
proﬁts with a safe ﬁrm, so it does with a risky ﬁrm. In turn, Proposition 1 tells us that a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the trade-credit rate rB to maximize discounted proﬁts with a safe






1+r −c. Our task is thus to show that, for
admissible parameter values, the supplier’s advantage in rescuing assets may be large enough to







The condition on the elasticity has a clear economic content. For the supplier to raise the
interest rate as much as possible, the elasticity cannot be too large or else the loss in the volume
of transactions will more than oﬀset the beneﬁts of a high ﬁnancial margin. Moreover, this con-
dition can be subsumed in the shape of the production function, Q(I), without imposing further
restrictions on the other parameter values. Hence, the second restriction for the equilibrium,
δ ≥ δ(rB), is actually the key one for assuring existence of equilibrium at the banking rate.
Plugging the baking rate into equation condition (11) yields δ(rB)=1−
πrB−r
1−π ,w h i c hd o e s
17not depend on the mark-up.7 The cut-oﬀ δ(rB) does depend, however, on the banking rate, the
probability of default, π, and the riskless interest rate r. Because δ is the fraction of inputs that
t h es u p p l i e rc a nr e s c u eu p o nt h ed e f a u l to far i s k yﬁr m ,i tc a n n o tb el a r g e rt h a no n e .T h eq u e s t i o n
then is whether there are admissible parameter values that allow for δ(rB)=1−
πrB−r
1−π < 1.
Taking into account that the banking rate is rB = 1+r




f +( 1− f)π
.( 1 5 )
For some δ ∈ (0,1) to satisfy the inequality (15) we must have
(1+r)f
f+(1−f)π < 1, or equivalently,
f
1−f ≤ π
r. In other words, the probability that a risky ﬁrm repays the debt, π,m u s tb eh i g h
relative to the fraction of safe ﬁrms in the industry, f.











1+r −c imply that there is an
equilibrium in which the supplier extends trade credit to both types of ﬁrms at the banking rate
at rB. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique, if we restrict attention to equilibria in which the
supplier extends trade credit to both types of ﬁrms. To see why remember that Propositions 1






1+r −c is a suﬃcient condition for the banking rate rB to be a strict optimal
trade-credit rate with a safe ﬁrm; a result that, from Proposition 3, extends to trade credit to a
risky ﬁrm if we add δ ≥
(1+r)f
f+(1−f)π. We have thus established:
Proposition 4 - Suppose that the demand for inputs is strictly concave and
f
1−f ≤ π
r.T h u s ,
there exists an equilibrium in which the supplier ﬁnances both types of ﬁrms at the banking rate
rB = 1+r
f+π(1−f) − 1 if and only if the interest-elasticity of the demand for inputs at rB is smaller






1+r −c and the fraction of unused inputs that the supplier rescues in case a
risk ﬁrm fails satisﬁes δ ≥
(1+r)f
f+(1−f)π ∈ (0,1). Moreover, the equilibrium is unique in the class of
equilibria in which the supplier extends trade credit to both ﬁrms.
Consider now our second candidate for an equilibrium with invariant rates, that is, trade
credit to both types of ﬁrms at a zero interest rate. Once again, Proposition 3 is the key
to characterize the equilibrium: If it is optimal to extend trade credit to risky ﬁrms at zero
7The intuition for the irrelevance of the mark-up is that, vis-à-vis banks, private information gives some
monopoly power to the supplier, making the elasticity of the demand for inputs important for the optimal
interest rate even if competition in the market for inputs drives prices down to the marginal cost.
18interest, then it is also optimal to oﬀer trade credit to safe ﬁrms at zero interest. Accordingly, we
simply have to show that there are parameter values that satisfy the conditions in Proposition
2 for zero to be the optimal trade-credit rate with a risky ﬁrm, that is, δ ≥ δ(0),
p








We can certainly assume that some suppliers enjoy monopoly power,
p
c > 1,a n dt h a tt h e






1+r−c. Showing that there exists δ ∈ (0,1)












(1−π)I(0) . Once more, the cut-oﬀ depends on the on the
banking rate, rB, the probability of default, π, and the riskless interest rate r. Unlike in the
equilibrium at the banking rate, though, the cut-oﬀ decreases with the mark-up
p
c.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
a large mark-up makes it easier for waiving interest to outweigh proﬁts without trade credit.
Proposition 5 shows that, for a suﬃciently large mark-up, there exist admissible parameter
values that make δ(0) < 1, allowing for some δ ∈ (0,1) to satisfy δ ≥ δ(0).
Proposition 5 - Suppose that the investment function is strictly concave on the interest rate and
that the mark up,
p
c, is suﬃciently large. Thus, there exists an equilibrium in which the supplier
extends trade credit to both types of ﬁrms at a zero interest rate if and only if the interest-elasticity






1+r−cand the fraction of unused inputs that











(1−π)I(0) ∈ (0,1). Moreover, the equilibrium is unique in the class of equi-
libria in which the supplier extends trade credit to both ﬁrms.
A quick inspection of Propositions 4 and 5 shows two major diﬀerences in the restrictions
for the two equilibria at an invariant trade-credit rate. For an equilibrium at the banking rate,
all we need is that demand for inputs is suﬃciently inelastic. For an equilibrium at the zero
i n t e r e s tr a t e ,w en e e dm o r e .T h ed e m a n dm u s tb es u ﬃciently elastic and the supplier must enjoy
monopoly power. Propositions 4 and 5 thus suggest that the equilibrium at the banking rate is
more pervasive.
Nonetheless, Propositions 4 and 5 also show the two equilibria with invariant trade-credit rates
share a common restriction. They both require a minimum level for the supplier’s advantage in
rescuing assets of bankrupted ﬁrms, δ. Economic intuition suggests, though, that a large δ might
19not be necessary if the mark-up and the elasticity of demand are so large that a reduction in
the cost of ﬁn a n c i n gt oz e r os i g n i ﬁcantly enhance expected proﬁts. Proposition 6 formalizes this
intuition.
Proposition 6 - Suppose that the investment function is concave on the interest rate, the mark-






1+r−f−(1−f)π at a zero interest rate. Then there is an equilibrium in which
the supplier extends trade credit to both types of ﬁrms at a zero interest rate, even if the supplier
cannot rescue any input when a customer becomes ﬁnancially distressed (i.e., δ =0 ).
Elliehausen and Wolken (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Ng, Smith and Smith (1999)
all report that interest rates in trade credit markets are often standardized. And that, in some
industries, suppliers waive interest when their customers repay the loans within 10 days. Waiving
interest rates is consistent with Proposition 4 and 5 if the demand for inputs is elastic with respect
to interest rates of loans of very short maturity. Moreover, Proposition 6 predicts that industries
with strong monopoly power are more likely to waive interest upon an early repayment.
4 Empirical Implications and Discussion
4.1 Do suppliers have incentives to release information truthfully?
Consider an equilibrium with invariant interest rates and suppose that banks request information
on the credit standing of a supplier’s customer. Is it in the supplier’s interest to release the
information truthfully? As it turns out, announcing that the customer is a risky ﬁrm is a weakly
dominant strategy for a supplier that can extend trade credit.
To see why, consider ﬁrst the equilibrium in which the interest rate in the trade credit market
is equal to the banking rate. In this equilibrium, the banking rate is an outside option for the
ﬁrms that prevents the supplier from further increasing the interest rate. If the supplier can
convincingly announce that the customer is a risky ﬁrm, banks will increase the interest rate
accordingly, letting the supplier increase the interest rate as well. The higher interest rate moves
the supplier closer to its unconstrained optimal.8 In turn, the banking rate is not relevant to the
8More formally, let rR
B b et h ei n t e r e s tr a t et h a tb a n k sw o u l dh a v eo ﬀered to a known risky ﬁrm. Competition
20supplier in the equilibrium in which the supplier waives interests. Hence, for a supplier that can
extend trade credit, it is a dominant strategy to announce that a safe customer is risky.
Consider now a supplier that cannot extend trade credit. Here, the incentives to release
information are reversed. If the supplier can convince the banks that its customers are safe,
the banking rate will decrease accordingly, and the customer will demand more inputs. If the
supplier has some monopoly power, then it is a strictly dominant strategy to announce that risky
customers are safe. Otherwise, the supplier is indiﬀerent about the banking rate and announcing
t h a tr i s k yc u s t o m e r sa r es a f ei saw e a k l yd o m i n a n ts t r a t e g y .
To be sure, banks can oﬀer some revelation mechanism to suppliers. For instance, proﬁt-
sharing mechanisms between a bank and a supplier should provide incentives for the supplier
to credibly reveal private information. Still, we are not aware of any study that documents
revelation mechanisms between banks and suppliers in standard trade-credit transactions. It is
conceivable, though, that some sort of revelation mechanism is in place in project loans that are
typically structured around very complex contracts. In these types of transactions, we do not
expect an equilibrium with invariant interest rates.
4.2 Monopoly power and informational advantage
So far, we have imposed no constraints on the structure of the market for inputs. Suppliers can
enjoy some monopoly power or face competitive forces that drives the input price down to the
marginal cost (
p
c =1 ). The question that we address in this section is whether the equilibrium
with invariant rates survives if competition in the market for inputs drives to zero not only
operational proﬁts but also ﬁnancial proﬁts.
Suppose that suppliers are all equally informed. In this case, there is no scope for a supplier
to proﬁtb yl e n d i n gt oas a f eﬁrm. Competition extends to the trade credit market, driving down
among banks implies that the expected return of a banking loan at the interest rate rR
B equals the cost of funds r.
Hence, π(1 + rR
B)=( 1+r) which implies that rR
B = 1+r
π − 1 >r B. This means that the interest rate in banking
loans increases if a supplier convinces the banks that the customer is a risky ﬁrm. As a result, the constraint in
the supplier’s program changes from 0 ≤ rR
T ≤ rB to 0 ≤ rR
T ≤ rR
B.S i n c e rR
B >r B, the constraint is relaxed,
implying an increase in expected proﬁts because a concave investment function implies that the supplier’s proﬁt
function is concave.
21t h ei n t e r e s tr a t eo fl o a n st os a f eﬁrms to the riskless rate r. Note, though, that the equilibrium
interest rate in loans to risky ﬁrms will not be equal to the riskless rate. In these loans, the
supplier takes into account the probability 1 − π that the debt contract will not be honored
and that, in default, only δI < I will be collected. As such, the interest rate rR
T that equals
the expected return on the loan to the riskless rate is larger than the riskless rate r.A n d w e
conclude that competition among equally informed suppliers breaks down the equilibrium with
invariance of interest rates in trade credit markets.
It is unlikely, nonetheless, that all suppliers of inputs are equally informed about their cus-
tomers. It should be easier to learn private information about your best customers. Hence,
although a threat to buy inputs from an alternative supplier may force a competitive price for
the inputs, it should not break down the current supplier’s informational advantage, which is all
we need for the analysis of our model to hold.
4.3 Invariance of interest rates and eﬃciency in default
From Proposition 4 and 5, the equilibrium with invariant trade-credit rates requires that suppliers
be more eﬃcient than banks in salvaging assets of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms. As it turns out, all
that the equilibrium needs is that suppliers are more eﬃcient lenders to risky ﬁrms than banks.
For instance, a supplier might have no advantage in rescuing assets and yet, as Cuñat (2002)
points out, be a more eﬃcient lender due to a threat of stopping the supply of vital intermediate
goods. Still, a low comparative advantage in salvaging assets of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms makes
it more diﬃcult for the threat of terminating the supply of inputs to be strong enough to assure
that trade credit to risky ﬁr m si sp r o ﬁtable. As we argue below, a testable implication of our
model then follows.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that suppliers oﬀer larger lines of credit to ﬁrms with a
low fraction of their inventory in ﬁnished goods. Petersen and Rajan interpret their ﬁnding
as evidence that suppliers have a stronger advantage of salvaging assets of ﬁrms that hold a
low fraction of their inventory in ﬁnished goods. Intuitively, once ﬁrms transform intermediate
goods into ﬁnished goods, suppliers can no longer use their regular sales force to sell the ﬁrms’
inventory. In this spirit, our model predicts that suppliers are more likely to oﬀer standardized
interest rates in industries with a low fraction of ﬁnished goods in inventory. This prediction will
22be rejected if the invariance of the trade-credit rate reﬂects a preference of suppliers for adjusting
input prices according to the risk of their customers. Or if trade-credit rates are equal to the
banking rate simply because suppliers do not have superior information about their customers.
4.4 Credit constraint and insurance against liquidity shocks
In a sample of small ﬁrms in the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF), Petersen
and Rajan (1997) ﬁnd evidence that the demand for trade credit is inelastic. Given the high
interest rate implicit in the standard discounts for early payments (e.g., 44 percent a year for
the 2-10 net 30 loans), Petersen and Rajan argue that credit constrained ﬁrms are more likely to
use trade credit. Yet, credit constraint cannot account for the invariance of the terms of credit
at positive rates. In the absence of alternative sources of ﬁnancing, suppliers are free to charge
the interest rate that maximizes expected proﬁts, which should vary with the borrowers’ credit
standing. The model thus predicts that standardized terms of trade credit should be available
mostly for customers that are not credit constrained.
Likewise, the evidence that the terms of trade credit are industry-not-ﬁrm speciﬁci sa to d d s
with arguments that relate high discounts in early payments (i.e., a high interest rate) with an
insurance against liquidity shocks. For instance, Wilner (2000) points out that, to preserve long-
term business relationships, suppliers have incentives to bail-out ﬁnancially distressed customers.
According to this argument, suppliers provide insurance against liquidity shocks that may lead
their customers into ﬁnancial distress. Anticipating these incentives, suppliers should embed
the cost of the insurance in the trade-credit rate. Note, however, that the expected cost of this
insurance premium should vary with the customer’s risk, implying that, contrary to the existing
evidence, the optimum trade-credit rate is ﬁrm speciﬁc.
4.5 Uniqueness of equilibrium with invariant rates
So far, we have restricted attention to equilibria in which, whenever possible, suppliers extend
trade credit to both types of ﬁrms. In this class, Propositions 4 and 5 exhibit conditions for
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in which, regardless of the ﬁrm’s type, the trade-
credit rate is either the banking rate or a zero interest rate.
23The reason for focusing on equilibria in which the supplier extends trade credit to both types
of ﬁrms is quite clear. There cannot be variation of interest rates if the supplier oﬀers trade credit
to customers that are all in the same class of risk. Yet, as often happens in game theoretical
models, there exists an equilibrium in which the supplier extends trade credit to safe ﬁrms only.9
In this section, we exhibit conditions under which this alternative equilibrium breaks down while
preserving the equilibrium with invariance of interest rates.
To break down the equilibrium in which the supplier extends trade credit to safe ﬁrms only,
it suﬃces to make it optimal for the supplier to oﬀer trade credit to risky ﬁrms. As before, the
net beneﬁts of lending to risky ﬁrms depends on the banking rate. Our ﬁrst task, therefore, is
to characterize the banking rate in the alternative equilibrium.
Assume then that the supplier denies trade credit to risky ﬁrms. If so, risky ﬁrms borrow
from banks to purchase inputs. Understanding the equilibrium strategies, banks update the
beliefs upon the request of a banking loan, as follows. If the supplier can oﬀer trade credit (an
event with probability x)t h eﬁrm that asks a banking loan is certain to be risky, and the loan
will be repaid with probability π. If, however, the supplier cannot oﬀe rt r a d ec r e d i t( a ne v e n t
with probability 1−x), a ﬁrm that requests a banking loan is safe with probability f —a n dt h e
loan will be repaid with probability one — while it will be risky with probability 1 − f,i nw h i c h
case the loan will be repaid with probability π. The expected return on a banking loan at an
interest rate ˜ rB is thus (1 + ˜ rB)[(f +( 1− f)π)(1− x)+πx].A n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t et h a tm a k e s
the loan’s expected return equal to the cost of funds r solves:
(1 + ˜ rB)[(f +( 1− f)π)(1− x)+πx]=( 1+r). (16)
Solving for the banking rate in equation (16) yields
˜ rB =
1+r
(f +( 1− f)π)(1− x)+πx
− 1. (17)
9There is no equilibrium in which the supplier ﬁnances risky ﬁrms only. To see why, suppose by contradiction
that such equilibrium exists. Still, a risky ﬁrm would borrow from banks when trade credit is not available. Hence,
the banking rate must be higher than the riskless rate to assure banks their cost of funds. However, this very
same banking rate, which is the safe ﬁrm’s outside option, assures expected proﬁts to trade credit to safe ﬁrms,
breaking down the candidate for equilibrium. A similar argument breaks down equilibria in mixed stratetigies.
24One can easily verify that the interest rate ˜ rB is bigger than the banking rate rB of the
equilibrium in which the supplier ﬁnances both types of ﬁrms (see equation (4)). Intuitively, the
banking rate ˜ rB takes into account that, in the alternative equilibrium, a larger number of risk
ﬁrms borrows from banks.
Now, let r∗R
T (˜ rB) b et h et r a d e - c r e d i tr a t et h a tm a x i m i z e sd i s c o u n t e dp r o ﬁts conditioned
on extending trade credit to the risky ﬁrm when the banking rate is ˜ rB. Provided that we
substitute ˜ rB for rB, the maximization program that yields r∗R
T (˜ rB) is identical to the program
(12) that maximizes discounted proﬁts the equilibrium with invariant trade-credit rates. Hence,
Proposition 2 characterizes r∗R
T (˜ rB), once we substitute ˜ rB for rB.
We now have all the necessary ingredients to break down the equilibrium in which the supplier
denies trade credit to risky ﬁrms. The equilibrium breaks down if the supplier is strictly better
oﬀ extending trade credit to risky ﬁrms at the interest rate r∗R



























> (p − c)I (˜ rB). (18)
Condition (18) requires that the discounted proﬁts at the trade-credit rate r∗R
T (˜ rB) outweigh
proﬁts when banks ﬁnance the risky ﬁrm at the banking rate ˜ rB. Except for the strict inequality
and the level of the banking rate, condition (18) is identical to condition (10), which makes it
o p t i m a lf o rt h es u p p l i e rt ol e n dt or i s k yﬁrms in the equilibrium that both types of ﬁrms have
access to trade credit. As such, we can rewrite condition (18) as δ>δ(r∗R
T (˜ rB)),a n df r o m







is a suﬃcient condition for r∗S
T (˜ rB)=r∗R
T (˜ rB)=˜ rB,
in which case the analysis in section 3.4 shows that δ>δ(r∗R
T ) is equivalent to δ>1 −
π˜ rB−r
1−π .










Note, though, that we want to break down the alternative equilibrium while assuring existence
of the equilibrium with invariant trade-credit rates. As it turns out, this twofold goal is achieved























But when is ˜ rB equal to rB?As u ﬃcient condition is that a supplier’s decision to deny trade
credit does not change the equilibrium banking rate. This additional condition will be satisﬁed,
for example, if we assume that the ﬁrm’s investment consists of purchases of several inputs from
diﬀerent monopolists, and that at least one of these suppliers is certain to be credit constrained.
In this case, asking for banking loans to ﬁnance purchase of inputs does not convey information
on the ﬁrm’s type. More formally, the probability x that trade credit satisﬁes all ﬁnancing needs
becomes arbitrarily close to zero. And, as one can easily check in equation (17), ˜ rB converges to
1+r
f+π(1−f) − 1=rB.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
As several studies have documented (Elliehausen and Wolken (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1994)
and Ng, Smith and Smith (1999)), the terms of trade credit in the U.S. are industry-not-ﬁrm
speciﬁc. Since there is evidence that, vis-à-vis banks, suppliers are better informed about the
economic health of their customers, the absence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation in the terms of trade
credit is surprising.
This paper provides a reason for why interest rates in trade credit markets do not reﬂect
suppliers’ private information about their cust o m e r s ’c r e d i tr i s k .W ea r g u et h a ti ft h ed e m a n d
f o ri n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d si ss u ﬃciently inelastic with respect to interest rates, then suppliers have no
incentives to undercut banks, regardless of the ﬁrm’s type. The trade-credit rate thus converges
to the cost of the customers’ outside option (a banking loan), which, by its very nature, cannot
reﬂect private information held by suppliers. In the other extreme, a suﬃciently elastic demand
may induce suppliers with strong monopoly power to waive interest, making private information
once more irrelevant to the trade-credit rate.
Our model does not account for all the reported rigidity of interest rates in trade credit
markets, though. In particular, under an inelastic demand, our model predicts diﬀerent terms
of trade credit to ﬁrms that, from the banks’ perspective, are in diﬀerent classes of risk. One
possible reason for the seemingly excessive variation of trade-credit rates in our model is that we
have ignored alternative mechanisms to vary the cost of trade credit. For instance, as Petersen
26and Rajan (1994) point out, suppliers allow for some variation in the actual trade-credit rate by
selectively granting discounts for payments after the due date. Yet, these ex-post renegotiations
are likely to be costly. To be sure, these costs elicit incentives for suppliers to vary interest rates
with the borrowers’ credit standing — as normally happens in banking loans (see Petersen and
Rajan (1995)) — making it hard to believe that renegotiations of contracts account for all the
reported rigidity of the terms of credit.
It is conceivable, however, that some suppliers use the price of their products — rather than
interest rates — to adjust for the risk of credit of their customers. In this case, the invariance
o ft h et r a d e - c r e d i tr a t ew o u l ds i m p l yr e ﬂect its redundancy. According to this hypothesis, the
rigidity of the terms of trade credit should not depend, for instance, on the costs that ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms may impose on the supplier. In contrast, our model predicts that the terms of
trade credit are more likely to be standardized if these costs are low.
27Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : The following lemma greatly simpliﬁes the solution of the optimal
trade-credit rate to safe ﬁrms.
Lemma 1: Deﬁne e r ≡ c





is twice diﬀerentiable and strictly
concave. Thus, any trade-credit rate that satisﬁes the constraints (8) and (9) of program (7)







strictly concave for any rR






< 0,f o ra n yrS
T ∈ [0,e r].
















































































































































< 0 for any rS















≥ 0 ⇐⇒ rS
T ≥ c







and strictly concave in [e r,rB].T os h o wt h a ta n yt r a d ec r e d i tr a t et h a ts a t i s ﬁes the constraints







> (p − c)I (rB) ≥ 0= ⇒ rS
T ∈ [e r,rB].S i n c ee r may be negative, the constraint (8) lets
us restrict attention to rS
T ∈ [max{0,e r},r B]. ¥
We are now ready to characterize the optimal trade-credit rate. By standard arguments
(continuity and compactness), there is a trade-credit rate — call it b rS
T —t h a tm a x i m i z e sΦS
T(rS
T) in
[0,r B]. If the supplier does not extend trade credit, then the safe ﬁrm will borrow from banks at
an interest rate rB, buying I (rB) units of inputs. In the absence of trade credit, therefore, the











1+r ) − c)I (rB) > (p − c)I (rB), where the last inequality holds
28because rB >r . Hence, it is optimal for the supplier to extend trade credit to safe ﬁrms at the
interest rate b rS
T.I fb rS






=0 . Otherwise, the solution
lies at zero or rB. Below, we provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for b rS
T.
Case 1: b rS
T =0 .I n t h i s ﬁrst case, reducing the interest rate as much as possible maximizes
discounted proﬁts. Hence, zero must satisfy the necessary ﬁrst order condition: Φ0S
T (0) ≤ 0.W e
want to write this ﬁrst order condition as a restriction on the interest elasticity at zero. From
equation (19) and I0 (0) < 0, Φ0S





















c > 1+r.H e n c e ,Φ0S






1+r−c. Noting that the absolute value of the
left-hand side of this latter inequality is our deﬁnition of the interest-elasticity of the demand for
inputs at zero,  (0) = −
I0(0)
I(0) , it follows that Φ0S
















T (0) ≤ 0.M o r e o v e r ,
p
c > 1+r =⇒
e r ≡ c
p(1 + r) − 1 < 0. From the Lemma 1, ΦS
T(rS
T) is strictly concave in [0,r B], implying that
Φ0S
T (0) ≤ 0 is suﬃcient for b rR
T =0 . And we conclude that b rR
T =0if and only if
p






Case 2: b rS
T = rB. As in case 1, a necessary condition for b rR
T = rB is that Φ0S
T (rB) ≥ 0.F r o m

















− c>0.A sar e s u l t ,
Φ0S












1+r −c ⇐⇒ Φ0S
T (rB) ≥
0.B yc o n c a v i t yo ft h ep r o ﬁt function in the interval [e r,rB], the marginal proﬁts decrease with
the interest rate in the opportunity set. Hence, Φ0S
T (rB) ≥ 0 implies that proﬁts increase with
the trade-credit rate in the interval [e r,rB].T op r o v et h a tb rS
T = rB it thus suﬃces to show that
ΦS
T(rS
T) < 0 for any rS
T ∈ [0,e r). But, as Lemma 1 shows, this is true by construction of e r.W e
thus conclude that b rS







Case 3: b rS
T ∈ (0,r B). Cases 1 and 2 provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the optimal
trade-credit rate to be a corner solution. Since a solution to program (7) always exists, an







1+r −c to exclude the banking rate as the optimal and either
p





to exclude the zero interest rate. ¥
29P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : The following lemma greatly simpliﬁes the solution of the optimal
trade-credit rate to risky ﬁrms:




p(1 + r) − δ(1 − π)
i






and strictly concave. Thus, any trade-credit rate that satisﬁes the constraints (13) and (14) of






< 0,f o ra n yrR
T ∈ [0,e r]






is positive and strictly concave for any rR
T ∈ [e r,rB].
Proof of Lemma 2 The discounted proﬁt conditioned on extending trade credit to a risky






















.F r o m





> 0 for any rR
T ∈ [0,r B]. Hence, conditioned on
constraint (13) being satisﬁed, ΦR
T(rR


















p(1 + r) − δ(1 − π)
i
− 1. It then follows from the constraint (14) and
(p − c)I(rB) ≥ 0 that a necessary condition for a trade-credit rate rR
T to be optimal is that it
belongs to [max{0,e r},r B]. To show that ΦR
T(rR









































































































































< 0.T h e r e -
fore, ΦR
T(rR







< 0. Since, ΦR
T(rR
T) ≥ 0 for any rR
T ∈ [e r,rB],








We are now ready to characterize the optimal trade-credit rate. By standard arguments
(continuity and compactness), there is a trade-credit rate — call it b rR
T —t h a tm a x i m i z e sΦR
T(rR
T)






< (p − c)I(rB), then, rather than extending trade credit at b rR
T,i ti sm o r e




















< (p−c)I(rB) implies that it is optimal not to extend trade credit to the






≥ (p−c)I(rB) implies that it is
worthwhile extending trade credit to risky ﬁrms at the interest rate b rR
T.W et h u sc o n c l u d et h a tb rR
T










































≥ (p−c)I(rB) or not b rR
T is either in one of the corners — zero or rB —o ri t






=0 . Below, we provide necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for each of these cases.
Case 1: b rR
T =0 .F o r t h e p r o ﬁt maximizer interest to be zero, it must satisfy the nec-
essary ﬁrst order condition Φ0R
T (0) ≤ 0.W e w a n t t o w r i t e t h i s ﬁrst order condition as a
restriction on the interest elasticity at zero. Since
πp
1+rI (0) > 0 and I
0 (0) < 0, Φ0R



































> 0, simple algebra shows
that Φ0R






1+r−c. Now, the second condition for b rR
T =0 to solve the
supplier’s problem is ΦR
T (0) ≥ (p − c)I(rB) ⇐⇒ δ ≥ δ(0). Since we have already established
p
c > 1+r
π+(1−π)δ > 1 as a necessary condition for b rR
T =0 ,
p
c > 1= ⇒ (p − c)I(rB) > 0.A sar e s u l t ,
p
c > 1 and ΦR














π+(1−π)δ. And we conclude that
p
c > 1+r
π+(1−π)δ is redundant, letting us write
p
c > 1, ΦR










c > 1, ΦR






1+r−c.S i n c e
p
c > 1 implies that (p−c)I(rB) > 0, ΦR
T (0) ≥ (p−c)I(rB) > 0= ⇒ ΦR
T (0) > 0. Because proﬁts


































0. The zero interest rate, therefore, satisﬁes the necessary ﬁrst order condition for maximizing
discounted proﬁts in [0,r B].N o w , f r o m L e m m a 2 , ΦR
T(rR
T) is positive and strictly concave in
[max{0,e r},r B]; an interval that is actually equal to [0,r B] because ΦR
T (0) > 0= ⇒ e r<0.
Hence, Φ0R
T (0) ≥ 0 is necessary and suﬃcient for the zero interest rate to maximize discounted
proﬁts in [0,r B].B u tt h e nΦR
T (0) ≥ (p − c)I(rB) (or equivalently δ ≥ δ(0)) suﬃces for zero to








c > 1 are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the zero trade-credit rate to solve the supplier’s
31problem.
Case 2: b rR
T = rB. Assume ﬁrst that δ = δ(rB) ≡ 1 −
πrB−r
1−π and p = c. By construction of
δ(rB), δ = δ(rB) implies that proﬁts are just enough to make it worthwhile extending trade
credit to the risky ﬁrm at rB,t h a ti s ,ΦR
T (rB)=( p − c)I(rB). Since we also assume that
p = c,i t f o l l o w sf r o mΦR
T (rB)=( p − c)I(rB) that ΦR
T (rB)=0 . Hence, e r = rB and, from
Lemma 2, ΦR
T(rR
T) < 0 for any rR
T ∈ [0,r B). Therefore, rB is the unique solution to the supplier’s
problem if δ = δ(rB) and p = c.N o w , p>c =⇒ (p − c)I(rB) > 0. Hence, if rB satisﬁes
ΦR
T (rB) ≥ (p − c)I(rB),i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tΦR
T (rB) > 0. Likewise, δ>δ(rB) and p ≥ c
implies that ΦR
T (rB) > (p − c)I(rB) ≥ 0= ⇒ ΦR
T (rB) > 0. It then follows that rB solves the
supplier’s problem with ΦR
T (rB)=0if and only if δ = δ(rB) and p = c.
Assume now that δ ≥ δ(rB) and p ≥ c, with strict inequality for at least one of the
two. From the previous paragraph, ΦR
T (rB) > 0 and, therefore, rB > e r. From Lemma 2,
ΦR
T(rR
T) is strictly concave in [e r,rB] and ΦR
T(rR
T) < 0 for any rR
T ∈ [0,e r). Hence, rB maxi-
mizes ΦR
T(rR

















1+rI (rB) ≥ 0.S i n c eΦR



















































1+r−c. We thus conclude that rB solves the supplier’s problem if p = c and








1+r−c and δ ≥ δ(rB).
Case 3: b rR
T ∈ (0,r B). Since there is always a trade-credit rate b rR
T that maximizes discounted prof-
its in [0,r B], a solution to program (12) exists if and only if δ ≥ δ(b rR
T). Hence, provided that δ ≥
δ(b rR
T), an interior solution obtains if and only if the necessary and suﬃcient conditions are not sat-
isﬁed for b rR
T ∈ {0,r B},t h a ti s ,Φ0R
T (0) > 0 and Φ0R
T (rB) < 0.C o n s i d e rﬁrst the zero interest rate.
Since I






























1+rI (0) > 0,v i o -











> 0 (or equivalently
p
c > 1+r
π+(1−π)δ), one can easily check that the necessary and



















π+(1−π)δ. Unlike the zero rate, we
cannot break down the optimality of the banking rate by requiring that requiring that ΦR
T (rB) ≤ 0
because, from Lemma 2, discounted proﬁts would be negative for any b rR







> (p−c)I(rB) to be satisﬁed. Note, however, that ΦR
T (rB) > 0 is redundant
if we assure the optimality of b rR






















































> 0,f o rrB > b rR














I (rB) > 0. From the analysis in case 2, a necessary con-
dition for rB to be optimal when ΦR








1+r−c. Hence, we rule out








1+r−c. And we conclude that b rR







=0 , δ ≥ δ(b rR






















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : Suppose that it optimal for the supplier to oﬀer the highest possible
interest rate to a safe ﬁrm, that is, rS
T(rB)=rB. We want to show that either it is not optimal to
e x t e n dt r a d ec r e d i tt ot h er i s k yﬁrm or it is also optimal for the supplier to oﬀer the banking rate
to the risky ﬁrm. From Proposition 1, rS







compare this restriction with those that arise from the optimal trade-credit rate with a risky ﬁrm,
we look at three mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities. If
p
c =1and δ = δ(rB), then,
from Proposition 2, rR
T(rB)=rB,a sw ew a n t e dt os h o w .I fδ<δ(rB), then, regardless of the
mark-up
p
c, it is not optimal to extend trade credit to the risky ﬁrm. The remaining possibility is
if δ ≥ δ(rB) and
p
c ≥ 1, with at least one strict inequality. In this case, the proof of Proposition 2
shows that rR








1+r−c ≡  R(rB). One can easily check
that  S(rB) <  R(rB) ⇐⇒
δp
1+r <c ; and this latter inequality holds because, by assumption,
rescuing unused inputs is not enough to assure nonnegative proﬁts when the risky ﬁrm fails. It
then follows that  (rB) ≤  S(rB)= ⇒  (rB) <  R(rB). Hence, if rB is the optimal trade-credit
rate to safe ﬁrms, then either it is not optimal to extend trade credit to the risky ﬁrm or rB is
the optimal trade-credit rate to risky ﬁr m sa sw e l l . C o n v e r s e l y ,rB is the optimal trade-credit
rate with a risky ﬁrm but not with a safe ﬁrm if  (rB) ∈ ( S(rB), R(rB)) or  (rB) >  S(rB)
33with p = c and δ = δ(rB).
Next, we show that rR
T(rB)=0implies that rS
T(rB)=0 . From Proposition 2, the optimal






1+r−c ≡  R(0), P
c > 1
and δ ≥ δ(0). Moreover, the proof of Proposition 2 (case1) shows that P




π+δ(1−π) ≡ pR. Hence, rR
T(rB)=0implies that  (0) ≥  R(0) and
p
c ≥ pR.I n t u r n
Proposition 1, tells us that, conditioned on the ﬁrm being safe, zero is the optimal trade credit




1+r−c ≡  S(0) and
p
c ≥ 1+r ≡ pS. Simple algebra shows that
 S(0) <  R(0) ⇐⇒
δp
1+r <c . As we have already argued, this latter inequality holds because
we assume that the supplier loses when the risky ﬁrm fails. Accordingly,  (0) ≥  R(0) =⇒
 (0) ≥  S(0). Likewise, pS < pR ⇐⇒ δ<1, which is true because δ =1would have implied
that, contrary to what we assume, the failure of the risky ﬁrm imposes no loss on the supplier.
It then follows that
p
c ≥ pR =⇒
p
c ≥ pS, and we conclude that the parameters of the model
that satisfy the conditions for waiving interest of a risky ﬁrm also satisfy the conditions for zero
to be optimal with a safe ﬁrm. In contrast, zero is the optimal trade-credit rate when the ﬁrm
is safe but not when the ﬁrm is risky if either  (0) ∈ [ S(0), R(0)) or
p
c ∈ [pS(0),pR(0)).
Finally, we show that, in case of interior solutions, the optimal trade-credit rate with a risky
ﬁrm is larger than the optimal rate with a safe ﬁrm. By combining equations (19) in the proof













(b r).( 2 3 )
Plugging b r = b rS


















, which is positive because the demand for inputs decreases with the trade
credit rate and
δp
1+r −c<0 by the assumption that the supplier loses when the risky ﬁrm fails. It






> 0 that b rS
T < b rR
T because ΦR
T(rR




























1+r−c. T od ot h i s ,n o t e
ﬁrst that since the demand for inputs decreases with the interest rate, rB > 0 implies that
I (rB) <I (0).N o w , d e ﬁne
I(rB)
I(0) = β(rB) ∈ (0,1).S i n c e rB is a function of π and r, so




































.I fδ (0,π,r) < 1 for some parameter values with
p







t h e nt h ep r o o fi sd o n eb e c a u s ew ec a nm a k eδ as close to one as needed. As a ﬁrst step of the
proof we will show that this is indeed possible for π =0 .







p . We claim that







p < 1 is not empty. Plugging rB =
1+r
























.F o r r =0and
p
c > 1,t h i si n e q u a l i t y





0 <I (0),w h i c hh o l d sb e c a u s eI(·) decreases with the interest rate
and f<1. W en o wp r o v et h a tt h ei n e q u a l i t yh o l d sf o ra n yr ≥ 0, provided that the mark-
up
p
















.T h u s ,
it suﬃces to show that ϕ decreases with r for
p
c suﬃciently large. Diﬀerentiating ϕ obtains
ϕ0(r)=I(rB)+I0(rB)1+r
f −I(0)c
p, after taking into account that 1+r
f −1 is rB evaluated at π =0 .





(1 −  (rB)) +I(0)c
p ≤ 0 for c
p suﬃciently large
if and only if  (rB) ≥ 1.T o s h o w t h a t  (rB) ≥ 1 note that, by concavity of the demand for
inputs,  (0) ≥ 1= ⇒  (rB) > 1, and, from Proposition 3, zero is the optimal trade-credit rate
with a risky ﬁrm only if its is also optimal with a safe ﬁrm. From Proposition 1, zero is optimal




1+r−c > 1.A sar e s u l t , (rB) > 1 a n dw eh a v ep r o v e dt h a t
δ(0,π,r) < 1 for
p
c suﬃciently large.
The ﬁnal step for proving existence is to show that δ(0,π,r) < 1 for
p
c suﬃciently large

















, δ(0,0,r) < 1
implies that δ(0,π,r) < 1 for any r>0 and π positive but suﬃciently close to zero. In particular,
it holds for the r∗ that solves 1 − c
p(1 + r∗)=0 .F o rs u c hr∗, δ(0,π,r∗) < 1 if π is suﬃciently
close to zero and
p




Finally, Propositions 2 and 3 show that δ ≥ δ(0),
p







suﬃcient conditions for the zero interest rate to be a strict optimal trade-credit rate, regardless
35of the type of the ﬁrm. Hence, if we restrict attention to equilibria in which the supplier extends
trade credit to both types of ﬁrms, then δ ≥ δ(0),
p







the equilibrium at the zero interest rate is unique. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6: In Proposition 5, the equilibrium with invariance at a zero interest rate




























c > 1.T os h o wδ may indeed be irrelevant, consider the inequality
(1+r)I(rB)−πI(0)
(1−π)I(0) ≤ 0,o r
equivalently,
(1 + r)
I ((1 + r)(f +( 1+f)π)−1)
I(0)
≤ π.( 2 4 )
By the concavity of I(.),a n yx ≥ 0 implies that I(x) ≤ I(0) + I0(0)x,w h i c h ,a tx =( 1+
r)(f +( 1+f)π)−1 implies equation (24) if 1+r
π ≤ 1
1− (0)(1+r)(f+(1+f)π)−1. This latter inequality is
























(1−π)I(0) ≤ 0,a sw ew a n t e dt op r o v e . ¥
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